We investigate the extension of the concept of Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS's) to quantum domain. We show that for the pair-wise game of Prisoner's Dilemma played in a population a twoparameter quantum strategy can invade a classical ESS. However in this game a quantum ESS cannot be invaded by another two parameter quantum strategy.
February 29, 2008
We investigate the extension of the concept of Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS's) to quantum domain. We show that for the pair-wise game of Prisoner's Dilemma played in a population a twoparameter quantum strategy can invade a classical ESS. However in this game a quantum ESS cannot be invaded by another two parameter quantum strategy.
Game theory has been successfully applied in modeling the evolutionary processses in natural world. Certain paradoxical situations [1, 2] in animal conflicts have been explained by the game theory. The concept of an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) was introduced by Maynard Smith and Price [3] . An ESS is a strategy, which if adopted in a conflict by a population,can withstand a small invading group. The ESS is thus stable and persists through time, provided that the payoff matrix and available strategies remain unchanged.
The concept of an ESS developed from applying the ideas of game theory to animal conflicts and recently certain ideas of game theory have been extended to quantum domain [4, 5] . The generalization into quantum domain of certain games has already been considered [4] . If the genes engage themselves in selfish games [6] played at molecular level where quantum mechanics decides the rules then it is interesting to speculate about the quantum analogues of ESS's. If the games of survival between animals give rise to ESS's then what about the possibility of quantum games among the molecules giving rise to quantum strategies that are stable and persist through time. If such a Quantum Evolutionary Stable Strategy (QESS) is a possibility then it may have interesting characteristics like its classical counterpart possess. They may be immune from invasion from other mutant quantum strategies. We consider the question of mutant quantum strategy trying to invade other classical or quantum ESS in a population engaged in a pair-wise game of Prisoner's Dilemma.
We will consider the symmetric version of the pairwise game where all members of the population are indistinguishable and each player is equally likely to meet any other player. In the Prisoner's Dilemma game the classical available pure strategies are Cooperation (C) and Defection (D) [7] . An interesting question is what strategies are likely to be stable and persistent in a population engaged in the pair-wise game of Prisoner's Dilemma. A simple analysis [8] show that D will be the pure classical strategy prevalent in the population. Suppose that a strategy A is played by almost all members of the population, the rest of the population form a small group of mutants playing strategy B constitute a fraction ǫof the total population. The strategy A is said to be Evolutionary Stable (ES) [9] 
is defined as the payoff to player playing A against player playing B, for all sufficiently small, positive ǫ.There exists some ǫ o , such that for ǫ ∈ [0, ǫ o ) the inequality is satisfied [9] . If for the given A and B the ǫ o specified is as large as possible the ǫ o is called the "invasion barrier". If B comes at a frequency larger than ǫ o it will lead to an invasion.
It follows [8, 9] that A is an ESS with respect to
If most of the players play A, then almost all potential opponents are A players, so if A does better against A than B does, B players will be persistent losers as the game evolves. We also assume that persistent losers are learning from their previous experiences and leave their losing strategy. However, if A and B do equally well against A, then how well the strategies perform against B becomes important. Therefore, for A to be ES against B the strategy A must then do better against B than B does against B. . Strategy A is an ESS if A is ES against all B = A. For A and B available pure strategies (classical or quantum) the corresponding fitness' [8] can be defined as
Where F A and F B are the classical frequencies of the pure strategies A and B respectively.
We assume the same quantum version of Prisoner's Dilemma, as described in [4] between two players. The pair of qubits are prepared in unentangled state |CC and sent through the entangling gate J. J is essentially a unitary operator known to both players and is symmetric with respect to the interchange of two players. The two players, who can be differentiated as focal and the opponent, then apply their local unitary operators U f oc and U opp respectively. An inverse gate to J is applied before the final measurement by the arbiter. Call s f oc the focal strategy and s opp the opponent strategy. The payoff table is the same as chosen in [4] and can be written as Opponent strategy: 
Arbiter applies Kraus operators on
The expected payoffs to the focal and opponent players are [4] : 
Where θ ∈ [0, π] and φ ∈ [0, π/2]. The classical pure strategies C and D are realized as C˜U (0), D˜U (π) respectively for one-parameter strategies and C˜U (0, 0), D˜U (π, 0) respectively for twoparameter strategies.
We consider three cases: (i): A single parameter quantum strategy [4] appearing as a mutant strategy against the strategy D existing as a classical ESS.
(ii): A two parameter quantum strategy [4] appearing as a mutant strategy against D.
(iii): A two-parameter quantum strategy appearing as a mutant strategy against the quantum strategy Q existing as a quantum ESS, where Q˜U (0, π/2). Quantum mechanical solution (Q, Q) is a unique solution which is also a Nash equilibrium [4] .
Case (i):
The expected payoffs are found as
So that the first condition for an ESS is satisfied and D˜U (π) is the ESS. The case θ = π corresponds to the case when one-parameter mutant strategy coincides with the ESS and is ruled out. It is easy to see that if D˜U (π) is played by almost all the members of the population, which correspond to high frequency
Therefore the fitness of a one-parameter quantum strategy, which also corresponds to the case of mixed (randomized) classical strategies [4] , cannot be greater than that of a classical ESS. A one-parameter quantum strategy, therefore, cannot succeed to invade a classical ESS.
Case (ii):
The expected payoffs are
It is easy to see that Case (iii) It is shown [4] that the quantum strategy Q˜U (0, π/2) played by both the players is the unique Nash equilibrium and one player cannot gain without lessening the other player's expected payoff. The expected payoffs are P (Q, Q) = 3
2 (φ)] cos 2 (θ/2) + 5 sin 2 (θ/2) Now P (Q, Q) > P (U, Q) holds true for all θ ∈ [0, π] and φ ∈ [0, π/2] except when θ = 0 and φ = π/2 which is the case when the mutant strategy U (θ, φ) is the same as Q and is ruled out. Therefore the first condition for Q to be an ESS is satisfied. The condition P (Q, Q) = P (U, Q) implies θ = 0 and φ = π/2. We have the situation of the mutant strategy to be same as Q and we neglect it. If Q is played by the most of the players, meaning high frequency F Q for Q, then it seen that W (Q) > W [U (θ, φ)] for all θ ∈ (0, π] and φ ∈ [0, π/2). Therefore a two parameter quantum strategy U (θ, φ) cannot invade the quantum ESS (QESS) ,the strategy Q˜U (0, π/2).
Conclusion:
The central concept of evolutionary game theory i.e the Evolutionary Stable Strategy can be extended to quantum domain. By considering the pair-wise game of Prisoner's Dilemma played in a population we have shown that if the players have got the option of playing quantum strategies then the classical strategy of Defection, existing as an ESS, can easily be invaded by a two parameter quantum strategy. However a two-parameter quantum strategy Q˜U (0, π/2) existing as a QESS is able to withstand invasion by a small group using other two-parameter quantum strategies.
